Family Law by McKnight, Joseph W.
SMU Law Review
Volume 24




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





T HE MOST significant event in Texas family law during the past year
was the enactment of title 1 of the Family Code,1 which deals with
the law of husband and wife. This recodification and revision incorporates
the provisions of the Matrimonial Property Act of 1967 and became effec-
tive January 1, 1970. Title 2 (Children) will be introduced at the regular
session in 1971. As the principal provisions of title 1 of the Family Code
are extensively discussed elsewhere,2 this survey of developments in family
law will be confined in the main to comments on judicial developments.
Several recent cases influenced the new legislation.!
I. HUSBAND AND WIFE
Family Property. In Burleson v. Burleson' the husband filed suit for
divorce in a district court in Harris County. While the action was pending
the wife brought suit and was granted a divorce in Nevada, though the
court made no disposition of the matrimonial property. The wife then
asserted her Nevada divorce as a defense to the husband's suit in Harris
County and filed a counterclaim asking for a division of the community
estate.' The case was transferred to a domestic relations court for trial. The
husband took a nonsuit, leaving the wife's counterclaim as the only matter
to be tried. On a jury finding that the wife had not been a bona fide resi-
dent of Nevada, and thus that the divorce there was invalid, the trial court
concluded that the marriage was still subsisting and dismissed the wife's
counterclaim. On the wife's appeal, the Houston court of civil appeals held
that the Nevada decree was worthy of full faith and credit and remanded
the case to the trial court for a division of the community property. The
court did not say, however, whether the trial court was to act as a divorce
* B.A., University of Texas; B.A., B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. tit. I, §§ 1.01-5.86 (1969).
2See Hawke, Divorce Procedure: A Fraud on Children, Spouses and Society, 32 TEx. B.J. 163
(1969); McKnight, Recodification and Reform of the Law of Husband and Wife, 33 TEx. B.J.
34 (1970); McKnight, Marital Policy Changes, 31 TEX. B.J. 627 (1968); McSwain, Revision of
Marital Property Rights Statutes, 31 TEx. B.J. 1013 (1968); Simpkins, Marriage, Annulment and
Divorce Revision and Codification, 31 Tax. B.J. 1015 (1968); Simpkins, Divorce Law Changes,
31 TEX. B.J. 629 (1968).
' For example, the holdings in Walter v. Walter, 443 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1968), and the earlier case of Foix v. Jordan, 421 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967),
error ref. n.r.e., were influential in the formulation of the provisions of § 2.03 with respect to valida-
tion of marriages celebrated by an unauthorized person, as well as the codification of the Texas
rules of informal marriage in §§ 1.91 and 1.92. In addition to the Family Code, the 1969 regular
session of the legislature also enacted a number of miscellaneous bills in the family law field includ-
ing amendments to the Juvenile Act, TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1 (Supp. 1969).
4419 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967), briefly discussed in McKnight, Matri-
monial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 138 n.50 (1968); Rasor, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 60, 68 (1969); VanDercreek, Texas Civil Pro-
cedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 174, 178 (1968).
"'Partition of the community property" is the phrase used throughout the opinion.
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court in making an equitable division of the matrimonial property or
whether it should make a partition of the formerly community estate as an
ordinary district court. In the meantime, during the 1967 legislative session,
as a result of the enactment of the family district court bill, domestic
relations courts acquired the jurisdiction in family law matters of ordinary
district courts.' On remand, the trial court divided the property and the
matter was again appealed. In the recent case of Carter v. Burleson' the
trial court apparently acted as a district court in making the partition.
The point, however, is unsettled and remains a nice question of jurisdic-
tion.'
In Carter another problem arose when the husband died before the court
considered the wife's counterclaim on remand." His independent executrix
was substituted as a party to the suit. The trial court awarded to the execu-
trix a cause of action for alienation of affection which had been filed by
the husband as a separate suit during the marriage. The cause of action
for alienation of affection was clearly the separate property of the husband
and not a community asset. Although there is not yet any judicial pro-
nouncement with respect to the constitutionality of article 461510 (restated
as section 5.01 (a) (3) of the Family Code11), a long line of cases (to which
Carter is the most recent addition) supports the proposition that certain
recoveries for injuries to a spouse may constitute his or her separate prop-
erty, apart from those occasioned by the loss of a separate property inter-
est in specie. The only means we have of measuring the value of any loss
is in terms of property value. In those instances, however, when the loss
has been an essentially personal one," the courts have treated the recovery
as separate property of the injured spouse. In 1915 the legislature attempted
to make recoveries for all personal injuries of a married woman her sepa-
rate property." This statute was obviously too broad as it included re-
coveries based on loss of earning power. It was therefore struck down as
unconstitutional, because the earning power of either spouse is the very
essence of community property.' In 1967 the legislature revised article
'The sections of this bill are scattered throughout TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338 (Supp.
1969).
7439 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
' It should also be noted that the court deducted the amount of the wife's attorney's fees from
the jointly owned property rather than charging it all to the husband's share, since the attorney's
services were rendered while the existence of the marriage was still before a Texas court. The wife
was also awarded one-half of the interest accrued on community savings accounts.
" In Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1969), the trial court announced an oral judgment
of divorce and an equal division of community property. Before a written judgment was entered,
the husband died. The wife filed a motion to dismiss. The Texas supreme court held that there
was a final judgment prior to the husband's death.
. IFor a discussion of this issue, see McKnight, Personal Injury as Separate Property-A Legisla-
tive.History and Analysis of the New Article 4615, 3 TRIAL LAW. F. 7 (1968). For a different
approach, see Comment, The Community Property Defense to Texas Torts, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 529
(1969).
11 TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01 (a) (3) (1969), formerly TFx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 4615 (Supp. 1969).5
'Wright v. Tipton, 92 Tex. 168, 46 S.W. 629 (1898) (statutory penalty); Nickerson. v.
Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886) (false imprisonment); Norris v. Stoneham, 46 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1932) (alienation of affection).
'$Act of Mar. 15, 1915, Tex. Laws 1915, ch. 54, at 103 (repealed 1967).4 Bell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 278 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1954), error ref.
n.r.e.; Northern Tex. Traction Co. v. Hill, 297 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1927).
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4615 and defined a recovery for personal injuries as separate property when
measured in terms other than loss of earning power during marriage."
In Whitley v. Whitley"8 it was concluded that the two-year statute of
limitations is applicable to actions for alienation of affection and begins to
run from the time of loss of consortium and not from the time of lessening
of affection of one spouse toward the other. Repeating earlier authority,
the court concluded that joinder of spouses is not necessary in bringing
such an action. Relying on a 1968 case," however, a court of civil appeals
has once again concluded 8 that joinder of spouses is necessary in suing
for a personal injury of either spouse when the recovery would constitute
community property." The injury took place in mid-1967 but the trial
was held about a year later. Nothing, however, was said about the statute
law applicable at either time.
Somewhat reminiscent of the dispute litigated in Lederle v. United
Services Automobile Ass'n ° is a recent case in the New Mexican federal
district court, Robertson v. U-Bar Ranch." There a Texas married woman
was injured due to the negligence of her husband while both were in New
Mexico. As in Lederle, the defendant sought application of the Texas law
of community property and the use of the doctrine of imputed negligence
to bar recovery. Under New Mexican law, however, recovery of a married
woman for injury and pain and suffering as a result of negligence is
treated as her separate property and the fact that her husband contributed
to the cause of the accident is irrelevant. The federal court in New Mexico
applied the New Mexican law (the lex loci) in awarding the wife re-
covery.
Business associations in which one of the spouses is involved has con-
tinued to create problems in characterizing matrimonial property as sepa-
rate or community.' Ryan v. Fort Worth National BankeM arose out of a
partnership transaction. The husband and his partner, joined by their
wives, made a conveyance of real property, reserving to the partners and
their named spouses certain mineral interests. A dispute arose as to whether
this reservation vested in the wives any property interest. The court con-
Is For example, recovery for pain and suffering.
1436 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
" General Ins. Co. v. Casper, 426 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967), error ref. per
curiam, 431 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1968), noted in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 55 (1969).
"STravelers Ins. Co. v. Jacks, 441 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969) (workman's
compensation case).
" The court's decision is contrary to the legislative intent in enacting article 4626 in 1967
which was reenacted as Tux. FAMILY CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 4.04 (1969).
20394 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), dismissed ab initio as moot, 400 S.W.2d 749
(Tex. 1966), discussed in Comment, Lederle-A Vote for the Domicile Rule in Interspousal
Conflicts Cases, 18 BAYLOR L. REv. 477 (1966), and noted, 44 TExAs L. REv. 551 (1966). It
involved the injury of a Texas married woman in Oklahoma.
2t 303 F. Supp. 730 (D.N.M. 1968).
" On the other hand, in Arizona, which does not sanction interspousal tort actions, the supreme
court of that state used the newer, significant contacts doctrine to allow a wife to sue her hus-
band for injuries sustained in an automobile collision in Arizona. The court held the law of the
domicile of the couple, New York, should apply. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 447 P.2d 254 (Ariz. 1969).
2 A case illustrating difficulties of proof with respect to separate partnership interests is Cox v.
Cox, 439 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
24433 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968).
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cluded that the reservation of title in the grantees amounted to nothing
more than a reservation in favor of the community estate of the couples
and vested no title to the mineral interests in the individual spouse. Even
if the husband uses community funds to purchase land and takes title in
the wife's name, this merely opens the way for parol evidence to show
that the husband intended a gift to the wife.' There was no such evidence
offered here.
The divorce case of Dillingham v. Dillingham"5 involved a corporate
situation. The corporation was wholly owned by the husband as his sepa-
rate estate. Though a divorce court, of course, can make any reasonable
division of the community or separate personalty that it sees fit, 7 here
the court concluded that the corporate acquisitions were for the community
estate and disposed of them accordingly.' In this refinement of the rule
in Norris v. Vaughn" the court relied heavily on a 1945 opinion of the
Attorney General"° dealing with inheritance tax liability in a similar situa-
tion. It recognized that to hold otherwise would enable a party to evade
Texas community property law by conducting business through an alter
ego corporation.
Another business related situation was Gillis v. Gillis."' In ascertaining
the community estate made available for division on divorce, the court
included the value of the husband's contracts to manage two mutual in-
surance companies. Using community funds, the husband had paid the
former manager to step aside so that he could get the managerial contracts.
Though the contracts were by their terms non-assignable and it would be
contrary to a rule of the State Board of Insurance' to market them, it
was shown that such contracts are in fact very marketable and dealing in
them is a common occurrence. Though the husband's position may not be
"property" in the strict sense, it clearly has a value and it yields a definite
profit. The husband could (with his powers) convert the two mutual
companies into stipulated premium corporations in which he would event-
ually own all the stock.
In a recent California case it was concluded that a divorce court has the
power to assign a portion of the husband's state retirement benefits to the
wife notwithstanding a non-assignability provision of the retirement law.'
This should be useful authority for those who seek to turn the tide of
Texas cases which have reached the contrary conclusion.' Several new re-
tirement plan cases came before the Texas appellate courts during the past
year but none appears to have turned on a non-assignability argument. In
2Higgins v. Johnson's Heirs, 20 Tex. 389 (1857).
26434 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968).
"See Keene v. Keene, 445 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
28 It also noted that even if the interest had been mistakenly characterized as separate by the
trial court, its division would have been upheld on appeal as a proper exercise of the divorce court's
discretion.
20 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
1°TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. 0-6595 (1945).
81435 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968).
32 Id. at 174.
2
Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 80 Cal. Rptr. 411 (Ct. App. 1969).
"
4 See McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 46 (1969).
[Vol. 24
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each instance the interest in the plan was treated as a part of the com-
munity estate. In Busby v. Busby,' a separate suit following a divorce,
the court partitioned the husband's past and future air force retirement
benefits equally between the husband and the wife.' In Webster v. Web-
ster" a similar result was reached, but since the couple had been married
only twenty of the twenty-four years that the husband had served in the
air force, the community interest in the military retirement plan was com-
puted at 20/24ths of the whole amount."
In recent cases the courts of civil appeals have given a very broad appli-
cation of the supreme court's decision in Francis v. Francis' which upheld
the validity of a contractual property settlement between a husband and
wife involving periodic post-divorce payments for the wife. At the end
of his opinion in Francis Chief Justice Calvert made this observation:
"Obligations of this type may be void or unenforceable for other reasons
[than that they constitute permanent alimony] but none are urged here
.... " The court seems to be alluding to the situation when, for reasons
of public policy (e.g., a contractual settlement to buy a divorce), fraud or
duress--or the mere lack of any community property to divide-there
would be no enforceable contract. But if the contract is not voidable and
there is no attack on the consideration supporting the agreement, it would
seem that any such contract is enforceable to sustain periodic payments to
the wife as her share of the community estate. In neither Brown v. Brown4'
nor Gent v. Gmenier," in both of which the contractual alimony was up-
held, does it appear that the existence of a property interest to settle was
disputed, though in the former it was argued that "the consideration . . .
was the agreement . . . to obtain a divorce."' The acid test for Francis
will be a case involving a property settlement when there was no existing
"lestate" to divide, though there is a large future earning potential in the
husband." But the enactment of the new non-fault ground for divorce'
makes the need for "buying a divorce" less pressing and hence the inci-
dence of such settlement agreements may be curtailed."6 Furthermore, the
3439 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969).
" As the above discussion of Dillingham indicates, a divorce court could have made a different
division based on justice and equity. See note 26 supra, and accompanying text.
a7 442 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
3 In Weaver v. Morris, 442 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969), a collateral attack
was made on a prior divorce decree, asserting error in allocating part of the husband's air force
retirement pay to the wife on the ground that it did not consider time during marriage that the
spouses resided in Texas. The decree was held not subject to collateral attack.
39412 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. 1967).
401d. at 33.
41 442 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969).
42 435 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968).
43442 S.W.2d at 461.
"The foreign property settlement before the court in Dicker v. Dicker, 434 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968), involved the latter factor.
4 TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.01 (1969) (insupportability without reasonable expecta-
tion of reconciliation).
41 See Comment, Substitutes for Alimony-A Review of Methods for Providing Periodic Support
Payments Subsequent to Divorce, 20 BAYLOR L. REv. 314 (1968); Comment, Permanent Alimony-
Disguised in Property Settlement Agreements, 11 So. TEX. L.J. 269 (1969). The tax aspects of
"contractual alimony" are treated by Bailey, Tax Aspects of Texas Divorce, 6 Hous. L. REv. 148,
155 (1969). See also Phinney v. Mauk, 411 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1969).
1970 ]
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principle enunciated in Andrews v. Andrews7 would seem to bar later
attack on settlements made for "the purchase of freedom." There the
court held that if the husband perpetrates a fraud on the divorce court
by not divulging that a property settlement agreement was entered into
to buy a divorce, equity will not allow him a bill of review to upset the
judgment incorporating the property settlement. In an attack by the wife
on a property settlement alleging fraud and misrepresentation of the value
of the community estate, the court concluded in Bell v. Bell' that res
judicata did not operate against her, but if the property settlement agree-
ment was fair and reasonable to the wife it would not be set aside in spite
of the misrepresentations."
Family Creditors. The continued appearance of the defense of coverture
of a married woman in contract actions indicates how slow the impact of
law reform can be"° and sometimes word of statutory revision 1 may not
reach all the courts. As Professor Huie long ago remarked, the 1911
statute for the removal of disabilities of a married woman for mercantile
and trading purposes" was not on its face as clear as it might be and the
decisions construing it were not as helpful as one might hope." We now
have a judicial interpretation of this old article seven years after its repeal.
The San Antonio court of civil appeals concluded that emancipation under
the statute did not relieve a married woman of the necessity of complying
with the provisions of the statutes requiring the joinder of her husband
and her execution of a separate acknowledgment when conveying her
separate realty.'
The exemption of the home from creditors' claims is one of the oldest
institutions of Texas jurisprudence. In November 1970, the people of
Texas will vote on a constitutional amendment passed at the last regular
session of the legislature to raise the ground valuation of the urban home-
stead from $5,000 to $10,000. But whatever the valuation, the existence
of the homestead must be established by the necessary requisites of the
existence of a family, intention and occupation. The problem of the exist-
ence of a family and existence of a "homestead on a homestead" is pre-
sented in Henry S. Miller Co. v. Shoaf.' In a divorce proceeding the home
was awarded to the wife. In such a situation when there are no children
the house normally loses its homestead character. But at that time the
wife's dependent mother was living with her and the court concluded that
the "new" or "continuing separate" family existed eo instanti on the
4'411 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
40434 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968).
49Cf. In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d 7 (Ariz. 1969).
"See, e.g., Sitton v. United States, 4"13 F.2d 1386' (5th Cir. 1969).
51 See Ace Rican Health Spas v. Patzakis, 446 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
5Tex. Laws 1911, ch. 52, at 92 (repealed 1963).
"Annot., Huie, The Community Property Law of Texas, 13 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 1
(1960).
"Brazell v. Tschirhart, 438 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
" 434 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968).
[Vol. 24
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termination of the first family." It has long been established that "the
acquisition of unimproved property with the intention of its becoming
homestead, followed in a reasonable time by acts evidencing that intention
and the subsequent actual use and occupancy of the property as a home-
stead, impresses the homestead character upon the property from the mo-
ment of its acquisition .... ""
A recent case' held that non-joinder of the wife is no defense to a
mechanic's and materialman's lien when the contract for construction was
made before the new homestead was occupied, even if most of the materials
were delivered after occupancy." A case involving the question of the extent
of occupancy needed to make property a homestead was recently decided
by the Austin court of civil appeals."0 A couple repaired an existing dwell-
ing and very briefly occupied it. They then moved to other premises which
were not purchased until after the husband died. The Austin court con-
cluded that the homestead interest was established and maintained.
The 1967 statutory revision of the matrimonial property law provided
a judicial means for insuring that purchasers of community property have
good title in various instances labeled "unusual circumstances."'" The cor-
relative provisions in the Family Code are made specifically cumulative of
existing rules.' Fort Worth v. Brandt" is an example of the anomalous dis-
tinction between Donaldson v. Meyer' and Reynolds Mortgage Co. v.
Gambill' in the operation of these existing rules. Relying on Donaldson,
the Fort Worth court of civil appeals held that a conveyance of home-
stead property is invalid if made by a competent wife when the husband
is incompetent, but not so adjudicated, and no necessitous circumstances
to require sale exist. In Reynolds a conveyance by a sane husband of an
insane wife in like circumstances was sustained. A rational explanation for
the distinction is hard to come by. At the time these two cases were de-
cided the husband would normally have been presumed to be the sole
manager of the community property in issue were it not for its homestead
character. That is still the normal situation today, but the 1967 reforms
make it less likely. If this analysis provides any reason for the distinction
drawn in the Donaldson and Reynolds cases, a determination that the com-
56 As to the homestead exemption from state and county taxes, a recent Attorney General's
opinion establishes that the responsibility for determining exemptions belongs to the county tax
assessor-collector, though the commissioner's court of the county may take away an exemption.
TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. M-328 (1969).
5 7Harkrider-Keith-Cooke Co. v. Smith, 284 S.W. 612, 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1926),
relying inter alia on Cameron & Co. v. Gebhard, 85 Tex. 610, 22 S.W. 1033 (1893).
"s Floyd v. Rice, 444 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969).
59 As to an architect's position with respect to a mechanic's and materialman's lien, if he has no
contract with the building contractor, has no written contract with the husband and wife, and does
not supervise as the statute requires, he has no lien capable of perfection under the statute. Lan-
caster v. McKenzie, 439 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1965).
°
0Sisnank v. Alford, 441 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969).
TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 4617, 4618 (Supp. 1969), replaced by TEx. FAMILY CODE
ANN. tit. 1, §§ 5.25, 5.83, 5.85 (1969). An example is when one spouse is incompetent, but not
so adjudicated.
"TEx. FAMILY CoDE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 5.25(i), 5.86 (1969).
63 444 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
64261 S.W. 369 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924), opinion adopted; cf. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Still, 163 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1942), error ref.
65 115 Tex. 273, 280 S.W. 531 (1926).
1970]
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munity property (on which the homestead is located) would be subject
to the wife's sole management were it not for its homestead character might
provide an argument that the authority of Reynolds should prevail over
Donaldson" when the competent wife is the seller.
Nineteen sixty-seven legislation expanded the jurisdiction of domestic
relations and juvenile courts in metropolitan areas to give them the same
authority that district courts have in dealing with third party claims in
family law disputes.67 But even though third party creditors may now be
joined in divorce actions in these courts, this does not give the divorce
court discretion to absolve one spouse or the other from contractual liability
entered into by that spouse.'
An interesting situation developed in Williamson v. Kelley' as a result
of a tax squeeze. There the widow in possession of the homestead which
had been the separate property of her late husband, sought to have it sold
and the proceeds re-invested because the property values had increased to
a point that the payment of taxes had become extremely burdensome upon
her." The Fort Worth court of civil appeals held that equitable relief was
unavailable in this circumstance, if the husband's heirs were unwilling to
join in seeking relief. The court distinguished Johnston v. Johnston,' where
all parties in interest agreed to such a sale. To grant the widow the relief
sought would deprive the heirs of their title to the realty without their
consent. The heirs could insist on their rights at law and thus foreclose
the operation of equitable principles.
Certain other post mortem problems involved non-homestead property.
In Gray v. Gray5 the widow qualified as community administratrix in
1928. In 1960 the wife conveyed certain real property "individually and
as community administratrix." The appellate court concluded that the
community administratrix did not convey the husband's share of the
community property since section 167 of the Probate Code7 1 precludes the
community administratrix from appropriating community property to
her own benefit. This provision was added in 1955 and had not previously
been before an appellate court for construction.7 ' This is a salutary de-
6 Another reason for the distinction is suggested in the Interpretative Commentary to section
157 of the Probate Code. It remarks that "fears concerning the business acumen of women" were
reflected in the last three sentences of section 157 as enacted and until amended in 1957. TEx.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 157, Interpretative Commentary (1956). For a complete analysis of the authori-
ties, see Comment, Conveying the Homestead Without Joinder of Both Spouses, 20 Sw. L.J. 794,
806, 809 (1966).
"'See generally TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338 (Supp. 1969).
" Broadway Drug Store v. Trowbridge, 435 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968). It
may also be noted that in attempting to show that a former husband is liable for his wife's pur-
chase of necessaries, their divorce judgment is not admissible as a prior inconsistent statement to
impeach the wife's testimony when the judgment did not reflect any statements of the wife and
did not contain any statements of her attorney at the prior trial, and the attorney was not called
as a witness. Gabel v. Blackburn Operating Corp., 422 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1969)
19444 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
70 She had entered into an agreement to pay the taxes as part of a settlement of a prior dispute.
71276 S.W. 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1925).
72424 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
7STEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 167 (1956).
' The Interpretative Commentary to section 167 merely notes that the last sentence of the sec-
[Vol. 24
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parture from the old statute and the opinions construing it. In Brunson
v. Yount-Lee Oil Co.m for example, the Texas supreme court held that the
qualified community administrator had the power to sell community
property regardless of the existence of community debts. "His bond and
his fair dealing with the property are the protection," the court noted,"6
given to claimants thereafter.77 By construing the conveyance in the limited
sense that the court does in Gray, the potential for abuse by the qualified
community administrator is greatly curbed. Fear of such abuses has caused
courts to be reluctant to appoint community administrators and bonds have
proved difficult to obtain." The purchaser must see to his own protection.
The difference between the unqualified community survivor and the quali-
fied community administrator is considerably narrowed by this construc-
tion of section 167.79
In Meletio Electrical Supply Co. v. Martinse a suit was brought by the
executor of a decedent's estate to set aside a conveyance of two tracts of
land to the decedent's widow as a transfer to defraud creditors. A judg-
ment creditor of the decedent intervened on behalf of the executor. The
court held that neither had standing to maintain an action to divest title
from the grantee and place it in the decedent's estate. The executor stood
in the shoes of the grantor who could not have maintained such a suit."
The creditor's error was in failing "to seek to foreclose its judgment or
otherwise subject the property allegedly fraudulently conveyed by the
decedent to the payment of the debt"' rather than attempting to divest
title from the grantee to the executor.'
II. CHILDREN
Adoption. It has been already noted" that the courts have had some
difficulty in applying the opinion of the Texas supreme court in Leithold
tion was intended to forbid a community administrator from mortgaging the estate to secure his
individual debts. TEx. PROB. CoDE ANN. § 167, Interpretative Commentary (1956).
75 122 Tex. 237, 56 S.W.2d 1073 (1933).
761d. at 243, 56 S.W.2d at 1075.
71See also Beaton v. McFarland, 134 Tex. 652, 134 S.W.2d 1058 (1940); Fidelity Union Ins.
Co. v. Hutchins, 134 Tex. 268, 133 S.W.2d 105, 135 S.W.2d 695 (1940); Patterson v. Twaddell,
301 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1957), error ref. n.r.e.
78 See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 155, 168, 174, Interpretative Commentary (1956).
"0 On the community survivor's right to sell community property to pay community debts, see
Burns v. Burns, 439 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969). In Coakley v. Reising, 436
S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 1968), the supreme court noted obiter that in the absence of debts a widow-
administratrix may maintain a suit in her individual capacity (as opposed to that of administra-
trix) as to the title to property of her late husband in which she maintains an interest.
80 437 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969).
S"Markward v. Murrah, 138 Tex. 34, 156 S.W.2d 971 (1941); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Morse, 132 Tex. 534, 124 S.W.2d 330 (1939); Wilson v. Demander, 71 Tex. 603, 9 S.W.
678 (1888).
82437 S.W.2d at 927.
sWillis & Bro. v. Smith, 65 Tex. 656 (1886); Cobb v. Norwood, 11 Tex. 556 (1854); Heard
v. McKinuey, 1 Posey 83 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1880); Moore v. Belt, 206 S.W. 225 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1918). See also Chandler v. Welborn, 282 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1955).
S4Rasor, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 69, 70 (1969).
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v. Plass." However, some courts still appear to be encountering this diffi-
culty."
Article 46(a) (6)" provides that a parent's consent to adoption may be
dispensed with on proof of two years of abandonment and non-support of
the child by that parent. These acts do not, however, make it mandatory
for the judge to give his consent to adoption by another person. This is
made abundantly clear in Rubey v. Kuehn8" where the trial court with-
held its consent to the adoption by the mother's new husband in spite of
proof that the child's father abandoned and failed to support the child
for two years. Giving the court all available views of the facts so that it
can exercise its discretion properly is one of the principal reasons for giving
notice to the non-consenting actual parent in the adoption proceeding.
If there is no notice, there is no contest, and the court will not have all
the necessary facts before it. The best interest of the child requires that
all the facts should be fully developed.
The question of the necessity of the appointment of a guardian ad litem
or attorney ad litem in adoption proceedings has twice been before the
appellate courts in the last year." In both instances the appellate court
concluded that if representation were not sought for the infant in the trial
court, no fundamental error had been committed by the failure to appoint
a representative."
Parental Responsibility. In Tharp v. Tharp"' an appellate court for the
first time considered the applicability of the statute requiring support of
a child over eighteen years of age who needs custodial care" when the de-
cree of divorce and child support order were made prior to the enactment
of the statute in 1961. The child was under eighteen at the time the origi-
nal order was made and at the time the statute was enacted. After the
effective date of the statute and after the child became eighteen the cus-
todial parent sought to invoke the provisions of the statute. The Houston
court of civil appeals distinguished the situation in Ex parte Hatcha where
the Texas supreme court concluded that when the legislature raised the
parental support age from sixteen to eighteen, children who had become
eighteen before the statute was passed were not affected. In Tharp the
85 413 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1967), discussed by Smith, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
22 Sw. L.J. 115, 118 (1968).
" See, e.g., McFarland v. Boyd, 431 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968).
11TEx. RFv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46(a)(6) (Supp. 1969).
88440 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969). But the child who gains a new father
through adoption loses his right to workmen's compensation benefits for his actual father's death.
Patton v. Shamburger, 431 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1968), noted in 6 Hous. L. REv. 387 (1968).
"'Grider v. Noonan, 438 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969) (attorney ad
litem); Rethaber v. Baumann, 433 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968) (guardian
ad litem).
"See Note, Family Law--Change of Name Proceedings-Failure To Appoint Guardian Ad Litem
for Minor Not Fundamental Error, 22 Sw. L.J. 649 (1968).
9t438 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
9 Tisx. REv. Csv. STAT. ANN. art. 4639a-1 (Supp. 1969).
98410 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1967).
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Houston court therefore concluded that the amendment was applicable
to revision of the original court order to require support."
In Frazier v. Levi" a matter of parental responsibility as well as of
public interest was raised in connection with a parental guardian's applica-
tion for the sterilization of a mentally incompetent ward, her thirty-four-
year-old mentally retarded daughter. The application was based wholly
on social and economic grounds, as there were no medical or physical
reasons shown for the operation. The parental guardian was a woman of
poor health and unable physically, financially and emotionally to care for
any more children of her ward. She and her husband were providing for
the ward and the ward's two children, both of whom were also mentally
retarded. The ward had the mentality of about a six-year-old child and
was sexually promiscuous. Further, while she was unable to support her-
self or her children, she was in good physical health. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant the petition for sterilization under
section 229 of the Probate Code which provides:
The guardian of the person is entitled to charge and control of the person of
the ward, and the care of his support and education, and his duties shall
correspond with his rights. It is the duty of the guardian of the persons of a
minor to take care of the person of such minor, to treat him humanely, and
to see that he is properly educated; and, if necessary for his support, to see
that he learns a trade or adopts a useful profession."
The court, however, went on to intimate that if the legislature should adopt
a statute authorizing sterilization with adequate due process safeguards,
such a statute would be constitutional.97
Several habeas corpus cases arose out of the failure to make child sup-
port payments. In Ex parte Herring" the court held that the trial court's
order committing the husband for contempt did not afford him due process
when he had no personal notice or knowledge of the hearing at which he
was ordered to show cause for failure to support his child. It was not shown
that he was deliberately avoiding service of process. In this instance his
attorney was served with notice pursuant to rules 308-A and 21a," but
his attorney replied that she had not been recently with her client and
"The obverse of parental responsibility and care is parental liability for a wrongful act of
the child. The doctrine of resposdeat superior was deemed controlling in Smith v. Cox, 446 S.W.2d
52 (Tex. Civ. App.---Corpus Christi 1969). There, the seventeen-year-old, apparently unmarried
(though married at the time of the trial) daughter of the defendant, was involved in an automobile
collision in the course of performing a family errand on behalf of her parents. The father-principal
was held responsible for the injuries proximately caused by his daughter's acts. Under TEX. REV.
CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4620 (1967), re-enacted as TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. tit. 1, 5 5.61(d)
(1969), all community property of the parents would be liable for this tortious liability. It seems
to have been assumed that the father was the principal in the transaction though the facts seem
to indicate that the mother was the principal. But if the mother-principal had been the defendant,
the results would have been identical.
0 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969).
eTEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 229 (1956).
" That the legislature is cognizant of related problems is borne out by the fact that during the
last regular session statutes were passed allowing non-parental custodians of minor children to give
consent for the child's medical treatment. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447h (Supp. 1969). In
the instance of venereal infection, minors themselves may give consent for their own treatment.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4445b (Supp. 1969).
98438 S.W.2d S01 (Tex. 1969).
99 TEx. R. CIv. P. 21a, 308-A.
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that she did not regard service upon her, as his attorney, as being sufficient.
The Texas supreme court concluded that such service was insufficient for
the purposes of due process. It would be useful in such cases as these for
the attorney for the respondent to report to the court an inability to
contact the client.
A pair of habeas corpus proceedings in child support cases in courts of
civil appeals touch on other aspects of such proceedings in those courts.
In one"°° the petitioner's right to initiate an original proceeding in the
appellate court was questioned because the grounds stated contradicted
recitals in the judgment of the committing court. The realtor asserted
that no contempt motion was filed against him, that he was not served
with notice and had no notice and that he had made no appearance per-
sonally or by attorney. The judgment recited that he had been duly cited
and appeared. The appellate court held the judgment regular on its face
and not subject to collateral attack by way of a writ of habeas corpus.
In Ex parte Fiedler' the right to initiate proceedings in a court of civil
appeals pursuant to article 1824a' as amended in 1969 was upheld. The
relator asserted that he had been held in contempt in the face of his
demonstrated inability to make the payments ordered. The amended statute
confers concurrent jurisdiction on the courts of civil appeals and the
supreme court to issue writs of habeas corpus in certain domestic relations
cases. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus had been filed in a district
court and denied. Though the relator had a right to appeal, it was held
he could still seek an original writ if confined under a void judgment or
order, as he alleged.5 °
In the area of custody several cases dealt with well established general
rules concerning change of custody, including the rule that venue properly
lies where the custodian resides."' There were, of course, several cases deal-
ing with the circumstances in which the plea of privilege as to venue is
waived. In one" an order placing temporary custody of a child with the
petitioning parent was held not to destroy the permanent custodian's right
to a hearing in her county of residence on the change of custody. Nor
would the permanent custodian's motion to increase child support and
modify visitation rights made in conjunction with the non-custodian's
.. Ex parte Williams, 446 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969); cf. Delgado v.
Delgado, 253 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952).
'0'446 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
10°TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1824a (Supp. 1969).
103 A strong dissent was filed by Justice Cadena on the ground that the majority's construction
of the statute would overwhelm the courts with habeas corpus proceedings. 446 S.W.2d at 702.
Anticipating this argument, the majority pointed out that the same fears could have been raised as
to prior law, that no such abuses had arisen, and if they should arise they could be controlled. It
was pointed out that leave is required before a writ of habeas corpus is filed in either a court of
civil appeals or the supreme court. Id. at 701.
104 Hagle v. Leeder, 442 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969); Campbell v. Campbell, 441
S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969); Rucker v. Rucker, 441 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1969); Czichos v. Meserve, 438 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
Hagle also stands for the proposition that if the defendant is a married woman, she is deemed to
live in the county where her husband lives and if he is in military service, venue lies in the county
where he lived before joining the military service, in the absence of a showing that he had changed
his residence.
"" Calloway v. Calloway, 442 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969).
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suit to change custody constitute a waiver of the permanent custodian's
plea of privilege.' Nor would a motion of a divorced wife to have her
former husband held in contempt for failure to comply with a divorce
judgment constitute a waiver of the plea of privilege in the husband's
counterclaim for change of custody."7 When a change of custody pro-
ceeding was brought under the number and style of the prior divorce ac-
tion and also mislabeled as a motion, it was held this would not constitute
reversible error if objection was not made at the trial.'"
Three cases focus on res judicata and full faith and credit problems
encountered in custody cases. In Knowles v. Grimes' the Texas supreme
court reiterated the rule that a change of conditions is the paramount
criterion in awarding a change of custody following a custody determi-
nation in another state. In that case, the paternal aunt and uncle of the
child had been awarded custody by an Alabama court. A suit for a change
of custody was filed in Texas in July following the Alabama decree made
the prior January. The child was visiting her mother and stepfather pur-
suant to the decree when the suit was filed. The final judgment of the
Alabama court was res judicata as to the best interests of the child under
the conditions existing at the time of that decree. In the view of the trial
court the fact that the mother was no longer employed, that she was more
emotionally stable, and that there had been some improvement in home
and financial circumstances were not sufficient to show a material change.
The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment in favor of
the mother. The supreme court reversed, reinstating the conclusion of the
trial court to the effect that there was no evidence of materially changed
conditions. The court restated its 1963 conclusion that "as a matter of
public policy, there should be a high degree of stability in the home and
surroundings of a young child, and, in the absence of materially changed
conditions, the disturbing influence of re-litigation should be discour-
aged." Further, a mere admission on the part of the Alabama custodian
of the good character and motives of the actual parent would not consti-
tute "changed circumstances. 11 But the Corpus Christi court of civil
appeals in Dobrmann v. Chandler"1 ' reached a strikingly dissimilar con-
clusion to that of the supreme court in Knowles on very similar facts.
Dohrmann was a habeas corpus proceeding brought by the father for cus-
tody of his three-year-old daughter. Custody had been awarded to the
father by a North Dakota court. The mother had taken the child from
North Dakota to Texas almost a year prior to the entry of the North
Dakota judgment. Two months after the judgment the husband brought
'0' Nixon v. Rohrback, 438 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
'' Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 441 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969).
... Huber v. Buder, 434 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968).
105437 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. 1969).
"
0 1d. at 817, citing Mumma v. Aguirre, 364 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1963), and Ogletree v. Crates,
363 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. 1963).
... The best interest of the child was also stressed as the vital factor in refusing an award of
change of custody in Blair v. Blair, 434 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968). Here also a
modest improvement in the mother's ability to care for children seven and eight years old and her
improved mental condition was held not to warrant a change of custody given to the father.
"' 435 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968).
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his habeas corpus proceeding in Texas. The jury found that a material
change in conditions had occurred and that the best interests of the child
required a change of custody. The only difference between Dohrmann and
Knowles is that the trial court found a change of conditions in the latter
but not in the former. The Corpus Christi court held that "the remarriage
and the new home, along with other factors affecting this child's welfare,
can amount to such a material change.". In a case similar to Dohrmann
the Fort Worth court followed Knowles in reversing the trial court's order
to change custody when the record did not reveal evidence of materially
changed conditions."'
That the presumption favorable to a child's being put in the custody of
its actual parent will not become operative unless a change of conditions
can be shown was also stressed in Knowles. Another facet of this pre-
sumption is illustrated by Tiller v. Villasenor." ' There the surviving mother
sought custody of her children after the death of the father. The court
said that there was a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of the
children would be served by awarding them to their actual parent, but it
is not necessary to prove that the actual parent was disqualified as unfit
to rebut this presumption. The presumption could be rebutted by the
children's preference for living with their uncle, even if they said they
loved their mother.
Juvenile Delinquency. In E.S.G. v. Texas... the language of the statute
defining a delinquent child was attacked as unconstitutionally vague. The
statute provides that "any child who ...habitually so deports himself as
to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others" is a de-
linquent."' The majority of the San Antonio court rejected this argu-
ment, but it was enthusiastically adopted in a strong dissent by Justice
Cadena. "8 He does not note, however, that the Arizona statute under
which young Gault"' was adjudged a juvenile delinquent ' contains lan-
guage identical to that of the Texas statute under attack.'1 In Gault there
was no attack on this provision as the other ground on which the child was
declared delinquent was not deemed subject to attack as unconstitutionally
vague.
11a Id. at 235. A strong dissent was registered by Justice Sharpe. As he points out, it is not clear
what the "other factors" were in this case. Id. at 237.
114 Reinhart v. Mancuso, 447 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
s'5 426 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
115447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969).
"
71TEx. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 3(f) (Supp. 1969).
118447 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969). Among other authorities he
cites Barrett, "Delinquent Child": A Legal Term Without Meaning, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 352
(1969). He appears to have missed the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in Leach v. State,
428 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968), where the same conclusion was reached.
1'91n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967), discussed in Rasor, Family Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 60, 60 (1969), and Steele, Criminal Law and Procedure, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 211, 213-15 (1968). See also Tenney, The New Dilemma in the Juvenile
Court, 47 NEB. L. REv. 67 (1968); Comment, Application of Gault: Its Effects on Juvenile De-
linquency Proceedings in Texas, 20 BAYLOR L. REv. 113 (1968).
"o AaMz. REV. STAT. ANN. S 8-201-6(d) (1956).
... The social worker's report was phrased almost exactly like the statute. Coxe, Lawyers in
Juvenile Court, 13 CRrME & DELINQUENCY 488, 491 (1967).
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The theme of Gault pervades in many of the juvenile delinquency cases.
In a recent civil appeals case"'s the district judge revoked a juvenile's pro-
bation and the juvenile appealed. The Fort Worth appellate court con-
cluded that since the juvenile did not have counsel and was not advised of
his right to counsel in the juvenile proceedings, the original adjudication
was invalid and hence there was no probation to revoke.s"
Ciulla v. Texas"M was a case of evidence illegally obtained in the arrest
of a juvenile. The juvenile was arrested for a minor traffic offense and
signed the citation agreeing to make an appearance as directed. As to the
traffic violation he should then have been released. But the officer, appar-
ently having suspicions about the ownership of the automobile, took the
youth to the police station and turned him over to the juvenile authorities.
He was not taken before a magistrate. About five hours later the juvenile's
person was searched without his consent or a search warrant and mari-
juana was found. On an appeal taken on an adjudication of delinquency,
it was concluded that the arrest was made without probable cause. It was
further found that the juvenile should have been immediately taken be-
fore a magistrate. Hence the appellate court held that the marijuana could
not be admitted into evidence. This case enunciates the proposition that a
juvenile has the same rights as an adult to the application of the exclusion-
ary rule for illegally obtained evidence." The court also intimates that if
the arrest had been properly made, the failure to take the juvenile before
a magistrate would have produced the same result. This would go further
than the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has gone with respect to its
interpretation of articles 14.04 and 15.17 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure.' " The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to agree with the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals."2 '
The Amarillo court of civil appeals concluded with regard to burden of
proof in juvenile delinquency cases that proof beyond a reasonable doubt
was necessary." But the Texas supreme court reversed,"' holding that
juvenile delinquency need be proved only by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the normal civil standard.'
12Gutierrez v. State ex rel. Wichita County, 433 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1968).
... See also Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968), noted in 22 Sw.
L.J. 889 (1968).
'2434 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
"'. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.23 (1966).
121 Corbin v. State, 426 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Hearn v. State, 411 S.W.2d 543
(Tex. Crim. App. 1967); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 14.04, 15.17 (1966).
121See Ganez v. Beto, 406 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1968). In Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957), the federal exclusionary rule is defined generally, and in McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943), the Supreme Court applied the federal exclusionary rule to the states. But there
is nothing there said about that part of Mallory dealing with taking prisoners before a state magis-
trate.
". Santana v. State, 431 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968).
'"~State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. 1969) (three justices dissented), noted in 23 Sw.
L.J. 914 (1969).
l"5 The issue was raised but not ruled on in DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969). The




Transfers of juveniles to district court to stand trial as adults... were
scrutinized in two cases involving allegations of homicide.' Dillard v.
Texas," the later and more significant of these cases, involved a juvenile
who at sixteen committed the acts alleged and at that age the juvenile
court waived jurisdiction and transferred him to district court for trial
as an adult. In the hearing before the juvenile court the state did not pur-
sue its delinquency petition but merely sought a transfer. Thus no adjudi-
cation of delinquency was made but the transfer was ordered. While his
appeal from the order was pending, he became seventeen. The appellate
court concluded that the prisoner's attaining age seventeen made the cause
moot and hence any errors committed in the juvenile court were beside the
point. In a concurring opinion Justice Johnson expresses his concern for
the present state of the Juvenile Act and its operation. Since the Act does
not state whether age at the time the act is committed or at the time of
trial is controlling, waiting to take action against a juvenile offender until
he is seventeen allows the Juvenile Act to be circumvented.
In In re GutierrezN the Fort Worth court of civil apeals held that a
juvenile delinquent was properly refused bond pending his appeal from
commitment ordered in a delinquency proceeding. The court rested its
decision on the discretion given the trial judge. Section 21 of the Juvenile
Act provides that an appeal from the juvenile court will not discharge the
juvenile from custody "unless that court shall so order. However, the
appellate court may provide for a recognizance bond."'" Allowance of a
bond pending trial in the juvenile court is not provided for by statute;
the child is either released or detained."N The right to bail in general is
essentially an issue of equal protection and is currently unresolved as a
United States constitutional issue. In Texas criminal law, apart from capital
cases where proof is necessary, bail is a matter of right. Under Texas law
prior to the enactment of juvenile delinquency legislation an offender
under seventeen years of age was not subject to capital punishment and
all accused persons under seventeen were therefore entitled to bail.1"' Texas
is by no means alone in its handling of this problem."a'
In Ciulla v. Hardy... the question was that of the duty of a district
clerk and juvenile court reporter to prepare and furnish a transcript and
statement of facts in a juvenile case when there is a showing that the child
... Pursuant to TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 6 (Supp. 1969); see Mountford &
Berenson, Waiver of Jurisdiction: The Last Resort of the Juvenile Court, 18 KAN. L. REV. 5
(1969).
"'Dillard v. State, 439 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969); In re Buchanan, 433
S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969).
"384 39 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969). For further discussion of Dillard, see
Comment, Trial of Juveniles as Adults-Past, Present and Future, 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 333, 340
(1969).
14 431 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth '1968).
... TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 21 (1964).
1 Id. § 11.
's, Wilcox v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 284, 22 S.W. 1109 (1893); Walker v. State, 28 Tex. Crim.
503, 13 S.W. 860 (1890); Ex parte Walker, 28 Tex. Crim. 246, 13 S.W. 861 (1890).
' See Comment, In re Gault and the Persisting Questions of Procedural Due Process and Legal
Ethics in Juvenile Courts, 47 NEB. L. REv. 558, 573 (1968).
"9431 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
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and his parents are unable to pay the cost of a transcript. The Houston
court of civil appeals held that the clerk should furnish the transcript
without cost and the child by his next friend was entitled to perfect the
appeal without giving security for costs."
140 See also Lee v. McKay, 414 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1967), commented
on by Steele, Criminal Law and Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 211, 214
(1968). It is worthy of note that at its last regular session the legislature enacted legislation codify-
ing the rule in Ciulla. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 21-A (Supp. 1969). See Tex.
Laws 1969, ch. 171, at 505, for provisions of a new § 7-B of the same article, providing for
counsel for the indigent juvenile
1970]
